Abstract. Asymmetric password based key exchange is a key exchange protocol where a client and a server share a low entropic password while the server additionally owns a high entropic secret with respect to a public key. There are simple solutions for this, e.g., [18] and its improvement in [7] . In the present paper, we consider a new threat to this type of protocol: if a server's high entropic secret gets compromised (e.g., due to cryptanalysis or a poor management), the adversary might quickly break lots of passwords and cause uncountable damage. In this case, one should not expect the protocol to be secure against an off-line dictionary attack since, otherwise, the protocol is in fact a secure password-only key exchange by making the server high entropic secret public. Of course a password-only key exchange does not suffer from this threat as the server does not have a high entropic secret at all. However, known password-only key exchange protocols are not very efficient (note: we only consider protocols without random oracles). This motivates us to study an efficient and secure asymmetric password key exchange that avoids the new threat. In this paper, we first provide a formal model for the new threat, where essentially we require that the active adversary can break`passwords in˛`jDj steps (for˛< 1=2) only with a probability negligibly close to exp. ˇ`/ for someˇ> 0, where D is a password dictionary. Then, we construct a framework of asymmetric password based key exchange. We prove that our protocol is secure in the regular model where server high entropic key is never compromised and that it prevents the new threat. To do this, we introduce a new technique by abstracting a probabilistic experiment from the main proof and providing a neat analysis of it.
Motivation
In the above new threat, the problem is meaningful only if the server high entropic secret is compromised while the server password table is safe. This could happen in the following scenarios.
1. Temporary access to server. In our daily life, it is not surprising that we temporarily leave our computer system on and unlocked (e.g., for a coffee break). If a server management does this, an attacker (also a user) could take the chance to copy the temporary internal state of the server (which does not need the access code) but he can not copy the password file as it further requires the access code. In this setting, we show that the attacker could manage to break the server key. To be concrete, we assume the server has public/private key pair .A D g a ; a/ where g is a generator of a prime group G with jGj D q. Suppose the server has a S. Jiang Usually, faulty errors are rare to happen. However, here "rare" only refers to the small frequency of occurrences. Over the long course of the server's life time, the probability that the faulty error occurs once could be very high. Also once it happens, the consequence could be very serious. Further, if an attacker has the chance to stay close to the server, he could make transient faults occur by increasing temperature or inducing static electricity.
To see the threat of fault analysis, we introduce the attack in [6] (improved by Arjen Lenstra) on RSA that is implemented using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (i.e., RSA-CRT). This attack breaks RSA using only one faulty error on a single bit. Consider an RSA signature system .N D pq; e; d /, where e is the verification key and d is the signing key. To sign message m, compute x D h.m/ with a hash function h, then compute S 1 D x d mod p and S 2 D x d mod q and finally use CRT to merge S 1 ; S 2 to obtain S D x d mod N . Assume that computation of S 1 is faulty such that S 1 D .x d C 2 i / mod p for some i < jpj (i.e., one bit faulty error occurs). Notice that S e D S e 1 ¤ x mod p while S e D S e 2 mod q D x. It follows that gcd.x S e ; N / D q. This factors N that is based on .m; e; S/ only.
Related work
The server key leakage problem does not occur in the password-only key exchange protocol since in this setting the server does not own a high entropic secret key at all. Hence, an asymmetric password key exchange against this threat is meaningful only if we have a construction that is more efficient than the known password-only protocols. Password-only key exchange was first studied by Bellovin and Merritt [4] and further studied in [5, 21, 28] . The first provably secure solution is due to Bellare et al. [3] but security holds in the random oracle model which is not our main focus. The first key exchange without random oracles is due to Goldreich and Lindell [14] . But it is very inefficient. The first reasonably efficient solution without random oracles is the KOY protocol [23] which has 16 exponentiations for a client and 15 exponentiations for a server. This protocol was abstracted into a framework by Gennaro and Lindell [13] and improved by Gennaro [12] (the contribution of the latter is to remove the signature), where each party costs 12 exponentiations when realizing their scheme by building a hashing proof system over N -residuosity-based CCA2 encryption [13] (note: although there are faster encryptions [20, 27] , it is not clear how to build a hash proof system over this type of encryption). Jiang and Gong [22] (recently abstracted into a framework by [16] ) constructed an efficient protocol. When using encryption in [20] , both schemes cost 6 exponentiations for a client and 6 exponentiations for a server. Katz and Vaikuntanathan [25] constructed a one-round password-only key exchange which 35 is the most appealing feature. But it is not efficient because in their currently best realization each party needs 12 exponentiations and one simulation-sound ZK proof.
The asymmetric password based technique was initiated by Gong [15] . Halevi and Krawczyk [17] (also full version [18] ) proposed a very efficient asymmetric password based key exchange, which essentially let the client use a CCA2 secure encryption to encrypt the password information. Using encryption [20] , this protocol only needs about two exponentiations for the client and one exponentiation for the server. It was later extended by Boyarsky [7] for security in the multi-user setting. However, neither of the two protocols can prevent the new threat as the password is encrypted under a server public key and can be easily decrypted if its private key is leaked.
Contribution
We first provide a formal model for the above server key leakage problem. We essentially require that an adversary can break`passwords in˛`jDj steps (for < 1=2) only with probability negligibly close to exp. ˇ`/ for someˇ> 0, where D is the password dictionary and has a size independent of security parameter. Under this assertion, the adversary can not quickly break lots of passwords. An asymmetric password key exchange protocol with this property is said to be persistent. Then, we construct a framework of asymmetric password based key exchange. Our construction is based on a tag-based projective hash family that is modified from the projective hash family (PHF) of Cramer-Shoup. We show that our framework is secure in the multi-user setting of [7] (under a different formalization, where our contribution is a new quantification on the authentication failure). Our proof does not rely on the random oracles. We also prove that our framework is persistent, where our main technical novelty is a probabilistic experiment and we provide a neat analysis for this experiment. Our persistency holds in the random oracle model. It is open to construct a protocol whose security and persistency both hold without random oracles. We instantiate our framework with a concrete tag-PHF. Our realization only costs 5 exponentiations for the client and two exponentiations for the server, which is significantly more efficient than all known password-only schemes. The efficiency of password-only protocols is surveyed in the previous subsection. A comparison between these protocols and ours is summarized in Table 1 , where the costs are computed under each protocol's currently best realization (e.g., public key encryption in [16, 22] uses [20] that only has two exponentiations for encryption cost). In this table, the password exponentiation g in [16, 22, 23] and our work is assumed to store in the server (but not the client as he can not memorize this long secret). We can tell that our protocol is significantly more efficient than known password-only protocols although the price is to let the server hold a high entropic secret.
Notions. x S samples x from S randomly; AjB means concatenating A with B. We use negl W N ! R to denote a negligible function: for any polynomial p.x/, lim n!1 negl.n/p.n/ D 0. For two functions f; g from N to R, write f .n/ g.n/ if f .n/ g.n/ is negligible. The probability distance of two random variables A; B over set is defined as
We say that random variables A; B are statistically close if distOEA; B is negligible. For a 2 N, define OEa D ¹1; : : : ; aº. PPT means probabilistic polynomial time.
2 Security model
Model when server high entropic key is not compromised
In this section, we introduce a security model for asymmetric password key exchange, which is slightly modified from the password-only setting of Bellare et al. [3] . There are n clients C 1 ; : : : ; C n and one server S , where S has a public key ‚ (known to all C i ) and a private key Â. It also shares a password i with C i . The server high entropic key Â is assumed uncorrupted.
D is a password dictionary. For simplicity, let D D ¹1; : : : ; N º with a uniform distribution.
…`U U is the`U th protocol instance in party U , where U is either a client i or a server S .
Flow i or msg i is the i th message in the protocol execution.
sid`U U is the session identifier of …`U U , where U is either a client i or server S . Intuitively, two jointly executing instances have identical sid.
sk`U U is the session key defined by instance …`U U .
pid`U U is the party, with which …`U U presumably interacts.
stat`U U is the internal state of …`U U (not including the long term secret).
Client.…`U U /. We know that for any …`U U , either U or pid`U U (but not both) is a client. Hence, it is well-defined if we use Client.…`U U / to denote this client.
Adversarial model. The capability of adversary A is defined as follows. He fully controls the network. He can inject, modify, block messages. He can also request any session key. Formally, his behaviors are modeled as access to the following oracles.
Execute.i;`i ; S;`S /. When this oracle is called, a protocol execution between …`i i and …`S S takes place. Finally, a complete transcript is returned. This oracle call models an eavesdropping attack.
Send.d; U;`U ; M /. Upon this query, M is sent to …`U U as msg d . This query models active attacks.
Reveal.U;`U /. Upon this query, session key sk`U U (if any) is returned. This models a session key loss attack.
Corrupt.i /. Upon this query, the password i of C i as well as his session states ¹stat`i i º`i are given to the adversary. After this, he is no longer active. This models a break-in or insider attack. We now define the protocol security, which considers three properties: correctness, authentication and secrecy.
Correctness. If two partners accept, they derive the same session key.
Authentication. If some …`U U , with U and pid`U U both uncorrupted, has been successfully completed while it does not have a unique partnered instance, then we say authentication is broken and denote this event by Non-Auth. Further, we use Non-Auth i to denote event Non-Auth such that Client.…`U U / D P i . Note that since the password dictionary D is small, one can always break the authentication by guessing a password i of P i and impersonating P i to S (through Send queries). So if Q i denotes the number of Send queries in which client is P i , then trivially, Non-Auth i can be achieved with probability
. Authentication property is to require that this is the best possible success. Formally, the protocol is authenticated if Cnegl. /, which is the security definition [3] for the password-only key exchange setting.
(3) We do not use PrOENon-Auth < Q jDj C negl. / as our authentication definition due to the attack by Boyarsky [7] against [18] . His idea is to eavesdrop a communication transcript tr between C j and S . Then he corrupts C i and obtains i . Next, he uses tr to conduct the execution between C i and S from which j will be compromised. In term of our model, he queries Execute.j;`j ; S;`S / oracle once and can break j when Q j D 0 (although Q i could be large). Under our definition, this will not occur.
Model when server high entropic key is compromised
Motivation. We now formalize the security where the server key Â gets compromised. This is possible due to cryptanalysis or a poor management. In the introduction, we have outlined the possibilities based on hardware fault or temporary server data for the protocol execution. Under such an attack, we can not hope that the protocol is secure against an off-line dictionary attack as otherwise the protocol is in fact a secure password-only protocol (by making the server secret public). We thus are only interested in a weaker guarantee: the adversary should not be able to break lots of passwords quickly. Under this, the server manager can have enough time to realize and defend the attack. Previous protocols [7, 17, 18] do not prevent this threat as they essentially encrypt a password under public key ‚.
It is desired that if an attacker intends to break`passwords, he has to do so using an dictionary attack individually on each password and with average costs jDj=2 dictionary guesses. That is, if any adversary runs T <˛`jDj steps, then he should not be able to break`passwords, where one step is essentially the cost of one dictionary guess and will be defined when the protocol description is available. Qualitatively, it is desired that his success probability is bounded by exp. ˇ`/ C negl. / for someˇ> 0. Also note that since`does not necessarily depend on the security parameter , we can not simply require the above adversarial success probability be negl. /. We notice that it is hard to tell whether an adversary has broken a password i or not. Hence, we can not directly use this definition. However, if this occurs, it should be easy for him to successfully impersonate client i , in which case Non-Auth i occurs. Hence, we instead define the adversary success as the occurrence of Non-Auth i for at least`different i . Finally, 40 S. Jiang we define the adversary capability. Since persistency only considers an attack that occurs under a very rare event and lasts only in a short time, oracle queries other than Send are immaterial.
Formal definition. Our formal definition of persistency is presented as follows, where event Non-Auth i is the same as in the definition of authentication property. Definition 2. Let`2 N and˛< 1=2. Assume that " is an asymmetric passwordbased key exchange protocol. Then " is persistent if for any PPT adversary A that is given system parameter param and server high entropic private/public key pair .Â; ‚/ and runs T <`˛jDj steps with access to Send oracles, the probability that Non-Auth i for`different i occur is upper bounded by exp. ˇ`/ C negl. / for someˇ> 0, where a basic step is specified in a concrete protocol.
Remark. Persistency is to capture the guarantee that it is impossible for an adversary to recover a lot of passwords in a short time. So the definition is only meant for large`. Even though, we do not choose to define the persistency like this: for any`> , the adversary succeeds only negligibly. This is so because under such a definition, it is not clear for a fixed`whether the choice of (in order to guarantee a certain persistency probability) heavily depends on`or not. Under our definition, this dependence does not exist as the contribution from`is exactly exp. ˇ`/ for a constantˇ> 0. Our definition also shows that the probability impact from`approaches zero exponentially. That is, slowly increasing`will render the adversary success probability approaching zero fast. This impact is missing if we only require the adversary success probability to be negligible.
Tag-based hash proof system
In this section, we introduce a tag-based hash proof system, revised from the original hash proof system [10] (in fact the brief introduction in [13] suffices) by adding a tag. Special forms of hash proof system are used by [12, 13, 16, 24, 25] to construct password-only key exchange protocols.
Subset membership problem
A hard subset membership problem is a problem that one can efficiently sample a hard instance. Formally, a subset membership problem I is a collection ¹I n º n2N , where I n is a distribution for a random variable ƒ n defined as follows:
Generate a finite non-empty set X n ; L n Â ¹0; 1º poly.n/ such that L n X n , and distribution D.L n / over L n and distribution D.X n nL n / over X n .
Generate a witness set W n Â ¹0; 1º poly.n/ and an NP-relation R n Â X n W n such that x 2 L n if and only if there exists w 2 W n such that .x; w/ 2 R n . Here L n can be sampled in polynomial time according to distribution D.L n / which outputs x 2 L n and its witness w. We use
to denote this procedure, and omit w if w is not our interest. Further, x D.X n nL n / can be also sampled in polynomial time.
Finally let ƒ n D hX n ; L n ; W n ; R n ; D.L n /; D.X n nL n /i:
We say that I D ¹I n º n2N is a hard subset membership problem if for hX n ; L n ; W n ; R n ; D.L n /; D.X n nL n /i I n , x and y are indistinguishable for
Tag-based projective hash function
Let ƒ D hX; L; W; R; D.L/; D.X nL/i be sampled from a hard subset membership problem I n . Consider a tuple ‰ D hH ; K; X; L; G; S;˛i, where G; S; K are finite non-empty sets, H D ¹H k . ; / j k 2 Kº is a set of functions from ¹0; 1º X to G and˛W K ! S is a deterministic function and˛.k/ is called a projection. K is called a key space, k 2 K is called the hash key; S is called the projection space for˛. We call ‰ a tag-based projective hash function (tag-PHF) for ƒ if for any x 2 L and tag z 2 ¹0; 1º , H k .z; x/ is uniquely determined by .k/; z; x. It is called an efficient tag-PHF if˛.k/ and H k .z; x/ are both polynomially computable from .k; x; z/ and if H k .z; x/ also is polynomially computable from x; w;˛.k/; z where .x; w/ 2 R. In this paper, by tag-PHF, we mean an efficient tag-PHF. For simplicity, we also directly use H k . ; / to represent the underlying tag-PHF.
The following notion of computational universal 2 is slightly revised from [19] , which in turn is extended from the notion of universal 2 [10] by relaxing the statistical indistinguishability to the computational indistinguishability. I n , where ¹I n º n is a hard subset membership problem. Assume that ‰ D hH ; K; X; L; G; S;˛i is a tag-based projective hash function for ƒ. We say that ‰ is computational universal 2 if for any PPT A with access to the oracles below, Pr. 
Finally, A outputs bit b 0 and succeeds if b 0 D b.
A useful lemma
Consider a hard subset membership problem ¹I º . Assume that ‰ D hH ; K; X; L; G; S;˛i is a tag-based PHF for ƒ, where
Here ‰ has a description desc.‰/. Let MAC K W ¹0; 1º ! ¹0; 1º be a message authentication code with secret key K 2 ¹0; 1º . Consider an experiment EXP involving an adversary A who can adaptively access to the following two oracles. Initially, let k K and provide .˛.k/, desc.‰// to A. Let ‚ D ¹ º and a challenge bit c ¹0; 1º. The above experiment is to distinguish many ¹H k .z; x/º x2L from random, given access to many values ¹H k .z; x/º x2X (x not necessary from L) provided that the query issuer can prove that he has some knowledge about H k .z; x/. The following lemma states that the adversary only has a negligible advantage in this task. The proof idea is outlined as follows.
Consider a hybrid experiment EXP`where the reply to the first` 1 Chal queries is .a 1 ; s 1 / while the reply to the remaining Chal queries is .a 0 ; s 0 /. By a hybrid argument, it suffices to show that for all`, adversary advantages in EXP`and EXP` 1 are negligibly close. We revise EXP`to b EXP`such that in the`th Chal query, x D.X nL/ in the latter (instead of x D.L/ in the former). This revision does not change adversary advantage from the hardness of I . So we only Persistent asymmetric password-based key exchange 43 need to show that adversary advantages in b EXP`and b EXP` 1 are negligibly close. This can be reduced to the computational universal 2 property of the hash proof system. To do this, we simulate b EXP`under the help of computational universal 2 challenger. The ith Chal.z/ query for i ¤`can be handled easily as we know the witness w for x. The`th such a query can be handled using a test query to computation universal 2 (CU 2 ) challenger and so it is easy too. Comp.z; x; ; m/ for x 2 L is easy under the evaluation help of his CU 2 challenger. Comp.z; x; ; m/ for x 6 2 L can be rejected simply as H k .z; x/ is indistinguishable from random in view of the attacker (recall only one evaluation query for x 6 2 L to CU 2 has been used now and so is valid only negligibly, unless MAC is forgeable). When 
Red ball experiment
We consider an experiment: there are n boxes, where box i contains a i identical balls except that one ball is colored red (located at any position with equal probability) and the rest of them are colored white. Algorithm A adaptively draws t balls from these boxes. Each time it chooses a box and then draws a ball randomly from it without replacement. Let`2 ¹1; : : : ; nº. Let ‚ A t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / denote the probability that A draws t balls from these n boxes such that`balls are red. Let ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D max A ‚ A t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n /. It is easy to see that ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / is symmetric on .a 1 ; : : : ; a n /. We can fully characterize it as in the following lemma.
Ä a n , 0 Ä`Ä n; t 0, then ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D Pr hX
We now outline the proof idea; details are in Appendix B. Use Left and Right to denote the left-and right-hand side of (4.1), respectively. First of all, there is an algorithm A 0 achieving Right and so Left Right. A 0 simply draws the ball from box 1 until the red ball is picked. Then, it turns to box 2 using the same strategy, then box 3, etc. Let the red ball in box i be obtained by using x i picks and then x i OEa i . Since it succeeds if and only if x 1 C C x`Ä t, Right is achieved.
S. Jiang
It remains to show that Left Ä Right. This is done by induction. Case`D 0 or t D 0 is trivial. Generally, if the box id of the first pick by A is j , we have ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j ‚ t 1;n;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; 0; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / C .1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / C .1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n /:
By induction, ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 . / and ‚ t 1;n;`. / can be bounded using the righthand side of (4.1). Substituting these into the above equation, simplifying will give Right. The main effort in Appendix B is to handle the tedious details and show that the sum is in fact equal to the neat result
Theorem 1. If t <˛`a and˛< 0:5, then ‚ t;n;`. a; : : : ; a/ < exp 2.0:
Proof. By Lemma 2, ‚ t;n;`. a; : :
where inequality holds since EOEx i D a 2 and the Hoeffding inequality.
Our PAKE framework
We now introduce our client-server password key exchange framework. Let I D ¹I º be a hard subset membership problem. Sample we can obtain this by further going through a key derivation function (e.g., [9] ) KDF W G 0 ! ¹0; 1º , where KDF has the property that when x G 0 , KDF.x/ is statistically close to uniform in ¹0; 1º . Let D D ¹1; : : : ; N º be the set of all possible passwords with uniform distribution. We say T; T W D X ! X are a regular transformation pair if they are efficiently computable and also satisfy the following.
R-1 For any 2 D, T . ; T. ; x// D x, for all x 2 X, i.e., T . ; / is the inverse function of T. ; /.
R-2 For any y 2 X, there is at most one 2 D such that T . ; y/ 2 L.
MAC k W ¹0; 1º ! ¹0; 1º is a secure message authentication code. The system setup is as follows. For the server S , take Â K and compute ‚ D˛.Â /. Then, Â will be the private key for S and ‚ will be its public key. For each client C i , take i D as the password for C i , shared with S . The key exchange protocol between S and C i is as follows (also see Figure 1 ).
If no, reject; otherwise, it takes ¹0; 1º and computes Remark. We outline how some attacks are prevented.
1. Impersonation attack. If the attacker impersonates C i to generate and send msg 1 D C i jyj 0 to S , then since he does not know i , T . i ; y/ 2 L holds with probability 1=jDj only. When x WD T . i ; y/ 6 2 L, 0 will be rejected since .k 0 ; k 1 / D H Â .i; x/ appears random to the attacker.
2. Insider attack [7] . When a malicious C j eavesdrops a transcript tr D C i jyj 0 jS j 1 j j 2 between C i and S , then he executes the protocol with S in the name of himself but using tr as a help. Toward this, he might send msg 1 D C j jyj 0 to S and hope to receive a response from the latter. 0 is acceptable only if 0 D MAC k 0 .C j jS jy/, where .k 0 ; k 1 / WD H Â .j; x / for x D T . j ; y/. The only useful information is 0 which is computed using .k 0 ; k 1 / WD H Â .i; x/ for x D T . i ; y/. However, no matter j D i or not, we have that .i; x / ¤ .j; x/ as i ¤ j (this is the main reason we use tag-HPS instead of HPS in this paper). This allows us to claim that k 0 and k 0 are computationally independent. If x 6 2 L, this is automatically true by the computational universal 2 definition. In our protocol, even if x D.L/, this computational independency still holds; otherwise, one can simply reduce to break the hardness of L. Thus, S will always reject 0 . Since this rejection occurs without considering the value of i , it follows that the candidate space of in view of the adversary does not reduce.
3. Session key secrecy. The session key sk D k 1 is computed by .k 0 ; k 1 / D H Â .i; x/. Client C i can compute this since he knows the witness w of x 2 L and server S can compute this since it knows i (for recovering x from y) and Â for .k 0 ; k 1 /. Any outsider can not compute .k 0 ; k 1 / since given x and ‚, H Â .i; x/ is indistinguishable from random (Lemma 1).
A concrete example
In the following, we present a concrete tag-based HPS toward realizing our protocol framework by slightly revising HPS in [10, 27] .
Hard subset membership problem. Let q; p D 2q C 1 be large primes. Let G be the prime subgroup of order q in Z p . Take 
w / (using witness w):
So H Â is a projective hash function. The difference of the above HPS from original HPS [10, 27] is that originally h does not get input tag i and that KDF is not used there. These changes are minor. With almost the same proof as in [19, Lemma 6 .3], we can show the following result.
Lemma 3.
If h is collision-resistant, then H Â must be computational universal 2 .
In order to realize our framework, we need to further specify T and T .
Regular transformation pair (T; T
; .x 1 ; x 2 // D .x 1 ; x 2 g 2 / and T . ; .y 1 ; y 2 // D .y 1 ; y 2 g 2 /. Evidently, property R-1 is satisfied. Property R-2 is satisfied as long as there are no 1 ; 2 2 D such that 1 Á 2 .modq/. To satisfy this, it suffices to take D D ¹1; : : : ; N º for N < q. However, in order to show the persistency, we actually take N D 2 =3 .
Efficiency of the protocol realization. Besides i (in C i and S ) and Â (in S ) are securely stored, assume g /. We do not account the cost for verifying .y 1 ; y 2 / 2 G 2 , as in Section 8 we show that this can be waived with only a negligible price. Note that a password-only key exchange can also solve the server key 48 S. Jiang leak problem. However, our protocol is much more efficient than such protocols; see Table 1 in Section 1.
Security
Now we prove the security of our protocol. Before this, we define the session id in the protocol as sid`U U D C i jS jyj , where U is the client i or server S. Since the password i and the high entropic secret key Â are both fixed after the system initiation, H Â .i; x/ is determined for given C i jS jy. Hence, two partnered parties must have the same session key. It remains to show the authentication and secrecy. They are showed together. The proof idea is as follows; details are put in Appendix C.
Idea of authentication and secrecy. The authentication property is to bound Non-Auth i for each i and the secrecy property is to bound the adversary success in Test query. Both events lie in the adversary view. Our strategy is to revise the adversary-challenger game 0 into 1 ; 2 such that neighboring games have indistinguishable adversary views and then consider 2 for these two events. Toward this, we first show some properties for 2 . Firstly, for each …`i i that accepts S j j 1 , it must have a unique partner …`s s . This is true; otherwise, this implies that the adversary can forge a valid 1 under MAC key k 0 (set by …`i i ), violating the unforgeability of MAC. Secondly, if …`s s accepts 2 and Flow 1 D C i jy j 0 was from some …`i i , then …`s s must have a unique partner …`i i . The reason for this is similar to the first property. We now consider the secrecy in 2 conditional on :Non-Auth i for any i . Since no Non-Auth event, "Flow 1 D C i jy j 0 was from some …`i i " required in the second property above is always satisfied. So any accepting instance (especially, test instance) has the unique partner, which also has this instance as its unique partner. That is, accepting instances can be uniquely paired with partnership. Especially, .k 0 ; k 1 / is only used in two partnered instances. If one of them is the test instance, then both instances can not be compromised by the restriction of Test oracle and hence the session key k 1 of the test instance is independent of the adversary view. So the adversary success probability in Test query is 1=2, conditional on :Non-Auth i for any i . Further, by the above two properties, we know that Non-Auth i occurs only at Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 / oracle, which has two cases. In Case 1, T . 
which has the probability 1=jD i j. As a summary, the first Send.S; ; C i jyj 0 / with y not generated by C i is accepted with probability 1=jDj. Similarly, the second query is accepted with probability
Hence, the theorem follows.
Theorem 2. Let I D ¹I º be a hard subset membership problem. Assume that MAC W ¹0; 1º ! ¹0; 1º is an existentially unforgeable message authentication code. Assume that ‰ is computational universal 2 for I. Then HPS-PAKE is secure.
Persistency
In this section, we prove our protocol's persistency. We need the following notion.
with H Â W ¹0; 1º X ! ¹0; 1º 2 be a tag-PHF. We say that H is locally unique with respect to a deterministic function F W D X ! X if for any PPT adversary A,
is negligible, where bxc is the least -bit of x and the probability is over the randomness of A; H , Â.
Remark. A tag-PHF is always defined with respect to a hard subset membership problem ƒ. So H inherits the randomness in sampling ƒ. The local uniqueness of H essentially requires that for any adversarially chosen .z; y/, each -bit string s corresponds to at most only one password such that bH Â .z; F . ; y//c D s.
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Persistency idea of our protocol. We want to show that for an adversary who has an access to Send oracles and MAC oracle (maintained by a challenger), within`j Dj basic steps, Non-Auth i occurs to`different i only with exponentially small probability. Toward this, we first modify Send.0; / oracle so that x D.X/ instead of x D.L/. This modification does not change the adversary success as X and L are indistinguishable due to the hardness of L in X. Then, y can be further modified as y D.X / (instead of y D T. i ; x/ for x D.X/) as these two generations are identically distributed. After this, y no longer carries information of i . We also modify Send oracle such that k 1 ; sk are not computed. This is no problem since they are not used to compute the oracle output. After this treatment, the only place to use password i is to compute k 0 and in turn k 0 will be only used to compute MACs 0 ; 1 ; 2 . We then present a simulation of challenger by splitting it to two entities .C 1 ; C 2 /. Here C 1 holds the password assignment ¹ i º for all clients and C 2 does not have ¹ i º and will maintain Send oracle and MAC oracle using .‚; Â; desc.H //. We present a technique in simulating MAC oracle such that i can be computed without password assignment ¹ j º and instead C 2 only needs to ask C 1 with .i; / whether i D . Our simulation has the property that any Auth i implies the successful password verification query .i; /. Hence, the adversary success in`different Auth i implies`successful password verifications at C 1 . On the other hand, the password verification process implies a red ball game: .i; / is a pick of in box i and it hits i if i D . As there are at most`˛jDj picks, by Theorem 1, it hits`different passwords with probability exponentially small. The detailed proof is in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let MAC W ¹0; 1º ¹0; 1º ! ¹0; 1º be a random oracle and H D ¹H Â º be locally unique with respect to T . Then, HPS-PAKE is persistent, where one MAC evaluation is a basic step.
Proof. We use PRS`to denote the event that Non-Auth i occurs to`different i , when adversary A is given .Â; ‚; desc.H // and access to Send oracles and random oracle MAC. We regard the interaction between A and the challenger (who maintains Send oracles and MAC oracle) as a game. Denote the game, where Send oracle is maintained according to the specification, by 0 . Then, we need to bound the probability Pr.PRS`.A; 0 //. Game 1 . We revise 0 to 1 such that if for Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 /, there exist a 2 ¹0; 1º and more than one such that bH Â .i; T . ; y//c D a, then we announce the success of A. Otherwise, for any Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 / query from A and any a 2 ¹0; 1º , there is at most one such and hence we can define pw Â;i;y .a/ D in case of existence and pw Â;i;y .a/ D nil otherwise. By local uniqueness of H Â , we have the following result. For simplicity, from now on, we assume that A never succeeds due to multiple event above and hence for any Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 / query, pw Â;i;y .a/ is always well-defined.
Game 2 . We modify 1 to 2 such that Send.0; / oracle takes x D.X/ (instead of D.L/). To be consistent, the only change in maintaining oracles in 1 is to evaluate H Â .z; x/ using Â (instead of using the witness of x) in Send.0; / oracle. By the hardness of L in X, adversary views View in 1 and 2 are negligibly close, where an adversary view is defined as his random tape and all the data received from the challenger. As PRS`is deterministic in the adversary view, we have the following result. Game 3 . We modify 2 to 3 such that the challenger is split into two parties .C 1 ; C 2 /, where C 1 holds the password assignment ¹ i º of all clients, and C 2 holds h‚; desc.H /; Âi. In addition, C 2 maintains Send oracles and MAC oracle. Proof. Taking y D.X / has an identical distribution as taking x D.X/ and computing y D T. i ; x/ because T. i ; / is a permutation of X. Hence, the revised Send.0; / does not change the adversary view. Notice that k 0 computed in the alternative in 3 is identical to that in 2 . Further, k 1 and sk are never used in generating an oracle output. Hence, each send oracle output in 3 has a perfect distribution as 2 . Finally, PRS`is deterministic in adversary view. Hence the lemma follows.
Game 4 . We modify 3 to 4 with the following changes. C 2 never asks C 1 to compute k 0 but he will request C 1 with any pair .i; / to verify whether i D . In addition, he also maintains a candidate space D i of i for each i , where initially D i D D. In Send oracle with client C i , if jD i j D 1, C 2 can process normally using the only i in D i to compute k 0 ; if jD i j > 1, whenever it requires to compute MAC.k 0 ; C i jS jyj /, he defines a virtual symbol undef-k 0 .i; y/ to represent k 0 D 52 S. Jiang bH Â .i; T . i ; y//c (unknown) and issues a MAC query MAC.undef-k 0 .i; y/; C i jS jyj /. Since in 3 , i is only used to compute k 0 and k 0 is only used to compute the MAC function, 4 is well-defined if MAC oracle is changed to be compatible with the above query, which is done as follows. To analyze 4 , we first prove the following claim. Hence, the two cases never occur and L is consistent with any assignment 
(a) Non-Auth i occurs in Send.2; i;`i ; Sjyj 1 j / query only if 1 is accepted while S does not hold a session with sid`s s D C i jS jyj and hence has never issued a MAC query .key; C i jS jyj /, where key is either the concrete k 0 .i; y/ or its virtual symbol undef-k 0 .i; y/. If L does not have a record for this .key; C i jSjyj j1/ before verifying 1 , then 1 is accepted with probability at most 2 (ignored); otherwise, the corresponding MAC query must be issued by A where key is the concrete k 0 .i; y/, which means that the test (b) Non-Auth i occurs in Send.3; S;`S ; 2 / with client C i . So 2 is accepted (e.g., by session sid`s s D C i jS jyj ) while C i does not have a session sid`i i D C i jS jyj , which implies that C 2 did not issue a MAC query .key; C i jS jyj j2/, where key is the concrete k 0 .i; y/ or its virtual symbol undef-k 0 .i; y/. If L does 54 S. Jiang not have a record for this .key; C i jS jyj j2/ before verifying 2 , then 2 is accepted with probability at most 2 (ignored); otherwise, the corresponding MAC query must be issued by A where key is the concrete k 0 .i; y/, which means that test i ‹ D pw Â;i;y .key/ issued during processing this MAC query is successful.
From cases (a), (b), we can see that Auth i implies a successful verification of i at C 1 . Denote the probability of the successful verification of`different i by p`. Then Pr.PRS`.A; 4 // Ä p`. We note that the password equality test between C 1 and C 2 is exactly a red ball experiment: i is red ball and pw Â;i;y .key/ is a pick from box i . Notice that ¹ i º initially is completely uniformly random in D n . Each pick either hits the red ball i or eliminates one white ball pw Â;i;y .a/ from box i. To be successful,`red balls should be hit. One pick in the induced red ball game implies one MAC query. As A makes at most˛`jDj queries, the number of picks by C 2 is bounded by it. By Theorem 1, within T <˛`jDj picks,`red balls are selected with probability at most by exp. 2`.0:5 ˛/ 2 /.
Summarizing the above bounding on p`and Lemmas 4-7, we conclude the proof of Theorem 3.
Analysis of our concrete protocol
In Section 5.1, we present an HPS for our framework HPS-PAKE. Call the realized protocol HPS cs -PAKE. In this section, we analyze it.
Security. As H Â is computationally universal 2 , security is implied by Theorem 2.
Persistency. By Theorem 3, the persistency holds if H Â .z; x/ is locally unique, which is seen in the following lemma.
Lemma 8.
If h is a random oracle and KDF W G ! ¹0; 1º 2 is a statistically secure key derivation function. Then, H Â . / is locally unique with respect to T .
Proof. Since b 2 is uniform over Z q , we ignore the probability b 2 D 0. Let .z ; x 1 ; x 2 / be the output of A. For any distinct 1 ; 2 2 OEN , let
where 1 D h .z ;
has an order of q. Further notice that 1 and 2 are independent and uniformly random (in Z q ). It follows that either B or A is uniformly distributed over G. Assume B has an order of q. From the independence between 1 and 2 , B is uniformly random over G for a fixed A. Hence, bKDF.B/c D bKDF.A/c with probability 2 only. As N D 2 =3 , the existence of a pair . 1 ; 2 / such that the equality holds, only has a probability at most 2 =3 , negligible.
Avoid a verification of y 2 G 2 . Our efficiency claim in Section 5.1 does not include the cost for the verification of .y 1 ; y 2 / 2 G 2 by S which needs one more exponentiation. This cost can be avoided by a slight modification. In msg 1 , instead of sending y D .g / from y when receiving msg 1 and the remaining specification for the server is unchanged. Denote the modified protocol by HPS cs -PAKE. The cost for the client and the server each increases by 2 squarings, which is tiny. In addition, the security of HPS cs -PAKE implies the security of the modified protocol HPS cs -PAKE. The proof uses the fact that for y 2 G, p y D y .qC1/=2 . So the attacker for HPS cs -PAKE can easily simulate the environment for an attacker in HPS cs -PAKE and the reduction follows. Details are omitted here.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Use EXP c to denote EXP when the challenge bit is c. It suffices to show that z; x/ is done under his own challenger's help. Specifically, the i th Chal.z/ query for i ¤`is answered by himself using witness w; for the`th Chal.z/ query, he takes x XnL and issues Eval 2 .z; x / query to evaluate H k .z; x /; for a Comp.z; x; ; m/ query, he issues Eval 1 .z; x/ to his own challenger and in turn he will receive .a; s/ D ? if x 6 2 L; H k .z; x/ otherwise. In case of the former, he records .z; x/ into a list L and rejects normally (as in 
B Proof of Lemma 2
Use Left and Right to denote the left-and right-hand side of (4.1), respectively. First of all, we show that Left Right by presenting an algorithm A 0 achieving Right. Here A 0 simply draws the ball from box 1 until the red ball is picked. Then, it turns to box 2 using the same strategy, then box 3, etc. If it draws a red ball from box`before t picks are used up, it succeeds; otherwise, it fails. Let the red ball in box i be obtained by using x i picks. Then, it is simple to verify that x i OEa i . Hence, the success probability of A 0 is exactly the right-hand side of (4.1).
It remains to show that Left Ä Right. When`D 0, the conclusion holds trivially since both sides are 1. Assume`
1. When n D 1, the two sides of (4.1) equal min¹t =a 1 ; 1º for the (only) case`D 1. For n 2 and` 1, we use induction on t. Note that ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / can always be achieved by a deterministic algorithm by computing the maximum success probability over the randomness of A. Hence, we assume that A is deterministic. When t D 0, the two sides of (4.1) are zero. The conclusion holds trivially. When t D 1, assume that the box id of the first pick by A is j . Then ‚ 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j ‚ 0;n;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; 0; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / C .1 a 1 j /‚ 0;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j ‚ 0;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / C .1 a 1 j /‚ 0;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n /: If`D 1, then this gives ‚ 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j Ä a 1 1 D Right. Hence, Left Ä Right. If` 2, then ‚ 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D 0 as ‚ 0;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D 0; ‚ 0;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D 0:
In addition, since x 1 C Cx` `> 1, we have Right D 0. Hence, Left D Right.
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Now assume Left Ä Right for t 1 draws, which implies Left D Right for t 1 draws since Left Right is proven at the beginning. We consider t (t 2). Assume that the first box chosen by A is j . Then, ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j ‚ t 1;n;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; 0; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / C .1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / C .1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / There are two cases.
Case a j D 1. Then, ‚ t;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a n / D ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n /:
Let a 1 ; : : : ; a ` 1 be the` 1 smallest numbers in ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a n ºn¹a j º. By induction, we have ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n /
Ä a n and a j D 1. Hence, .a 1 ; : : : ; a ` 1 / equals .a 1 ; : : : ; a` 1 /. Therefore,
Since a`D 1, it follows that x`D 1 always holds when x` OEa`. So
The induction holds in this case. If j Ä`, then ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a ` 1 º D ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a`º. Hence,
Persistent asymmetric password-based key exchange 59 where the last equality holds since a j D 1 and hence x j D 1 holds always. Hence, the induction holds in this case too.
Case a j > 1 and j >`. In this case, ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a` 1 º are the` 1 smallest numbers in ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a n ºn¹a j º. By induction assumption on t 1, we have a 1 j ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D a
In addition, if a j > a`, then ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a`º are the`smallest numbers in ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n º. Hence,
.1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n /
Therefore, in (4.1), we have that Right Left equals
We need to show that Right Left 0. We split event P` 1 i D1 x i Ä t 1 into two sub-events
In case of event B, since x`Ä a`always holds,
Hence, Right Left holds in this case.
If a j Ä a`, then a j D a`since by assumption a j a`for j >`holds always. In this case, ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a` 1 ; a` 1º are the`smallest numbers among ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n º. Hence, .1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n /
Further, a 1 j ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D a
Combining the above two equations, we have that in this case Left D Right.
Case a j > 1 and j Ä`. In this case, ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a`ºn¹a j º are the` 1 smallest numbers among ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a n ºn¹a j º. By induction assumption on t 1, we have a 1 j ‚ t 1;n 1;` 1 .a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D a 1 j Pr h X 1Äi Ä`;i¤j
Note that ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a`º are the`smallest numbers in ¹a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n º. Hence,
.1 a 1 j /‚ t 1;n;`. a 1 ; : : : ; a j 1 ; a j 1; a j C1 ; : : : ; a n / D .1 a
Combining the above two equations, we conclude the result in this case. As a summary, the induction holds for all cases. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
C Proof of Theorem 2
We modify the security game (denoted by rea ) into games 0 (D rea ), 1 . If x is not generated in Send.0; i; / (note it could be generated by client i 0 ¤ i ), then .i; x; ; / 6 2 and hence 0 will be verified by the challenger of B using .k 0 ; k 1 / D H Â .i; x/ computed using Â . In this case, .a; s/ D ? if 0 is invalid; .a; s/ D .k 0 ; k 1 / otherwise. Hence, in any case, the simulation in this query is consistent with c . Corrupt.i /. As seen above, stat`i i is well defined and i is known. Hence, the simulation is normal.
From the description of B, we can see that when challenge bit c D 0, the simulated game by B is 0 ; otherwise, it is 1 . Hence, the distinguishability between 0 and 1 leads to violate Lemma 1. We analyze 2 . Recall that, in Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 /, when .i; y; ; / 6 2 Q, we define .k Proof. Let us assume that the lemma is not true. Let an irregular query be a Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 / query where .i; y; ; / 6 2 Q and T . i ; y/ 6 2 L. Let the number of irregular queries be bounded by . Use Bad i to represent the event: the i th irregular query is the first Bad event. Note that when Bad occurs, there exists a unique Bad i event.
We now construct an adversary A 0 to break the computational universal 2 property of ‰. Upon desc.‰/; ‚, A 0 takes t ¹1; : : : ; º and initializes i for each C i and simulates 2 , except when he needs to use Â , which is one of the following scenarios (especially note that .k 0 ; k 1 / in Send.0; / is taken randomly in ¹0; 1º 2 without using Â). (1) S is corrupted and Â should be given to A. This will not occur since we assume S is uncorrupted. (2) In Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 /, A 0 will use Â to compute .k 0 0 ; k 0 1 / in case of .i; y; ; / 6 2 Q. In this case, A 0 can compute x D T . i ; y/ and query his Eval 1 oracle to compute H Â .i; x/. When x 2 L, he will receive H Â .i; x/; when x 6 2 L, he will receive ?. For the former case, he proceeds normally; for the latter case, it is an irregular query. If this is the j th irregular query for j < t, then he rejects 0 ; if it is the t th irregular query, he issues .i; x/ as a Test query, in turn he will receive .a c ; s c / for challenge bit c. If 0 D MAC a c .C i jS jy/, he outputs 0; otherwise 1. First of all, when c D 1, a c is independent of the adversary view prior to the current query, by unforgeability of MAC, 0 D MAC a 1 .C i jS jy/ holds negligibly only. We ignore this tiny probability. When c D 0 and t is correct, the adversary view till the current query is identical to his view in 2 . In this case, the validity of 0 is a Bad t event, in which A 0 must output 0. Since Bad t event implies that 0 is valid and that upon such an event the simulation by A 0 prior to the tth irregular query is identical to 2 (even without considering the output of A 0 in the case c D 0 with an incorrect t), we always have that Proof. Note that sid`i i D C i jS jy j . Since S will not sample the same twice (ignore the negligible probability), it follows that the number of partnered instance …`S S for …`i i is at most one. It suffices to prove the existence. If it does not exist, we show MAC is forgeable. Assume that stat`i i after sending msg 1 is C i jS jy jk 0 jk 1 . Then, reviewing the definitions of oracles in 2 , besides computing MAC k 0 . / function, k 0 (and its identical copy k 0 0 ) will be used only in the following scenarios before …`i i verifies msg 2 : k 0 is revealed due to the corruption of C i (note S is uncorrupted), which is impossible since a corrupted party is controlled by A and so Send.2; i;`i ; msg 2 / query would not have occurred. Hence, prior to verifying msg 2 by …`i i , 2 uses k 0 only for evaluating MAC k 0 . /. To reduce to the unforgeability of MAC, it suffices to show that prior to verifying msg 2 in …`i i , the simulator never evaluates and outputs MAC k 0 . / with input C i jS jy j j1. Otherwise, since 0 ; 1 ; 2 have different input formats, this evaluation must be done by S in some Send.1; S;`0 S ; /, which already implies that …`0 s s is partnered with C i , contradicting our assumption. Thus, the validity of 1 implies breaking the unforgeability of MAC.
Lemma 13. Let pid`S S .WD C i / be uncorrupted. If .i; y ; ; / 2 Q in Send.1; S;`S ; C i jy j 0 / oracle and 2 is accepted in Send.3; S;`S ; 2 /, then …` S S has a unique partner …`i i .
Proof. The number of partners of …`S S is at most one, due to Normal condition on x. It suffices to prove the existence. Assume this is not true. By assumption, in Send.1; S;` S ; C i jy j 0 /, it holds that .i; y ; k 0 ; k 1 / 2 Q for some k 0 ; k 1 and it also holds that 0 D MAC k 0 .C i jS jy / (otherwise, 0 in msg 1 was rejected and it would be impossible for …`S S to verify and accept 2 ). Hence, the fact that .i; y ; k 0 ; k 1 / was recorded in Q implies that …`i i for some`i must have sampled x D T . i ; y /. By Normal condition, …`i i is the only instance that samples this Corrupt.i /. Upon this query i as well as ¹stat`i i º`i will be available to A. Since i ¤ J; S by Test restriction, by induction, the conclusion holds after this query.
Test.u;` u /. The reply in this query is˛b. The conclusion holds trivially after this query.
As a summary, our conclusion holds and hence view.A/ is independent of b. Proof. To prove the lemma, we show how to simulate 2 when ¹ i º i is random while the remaining randomness r of the game is fixed. Let D i be the candidate space for i after each query. Our simulation has a ?-property: after query t, view t .A/ is unchanged over each . Q n j D1 D j , the adversary view in the current query is identical. By induction assumption, after this query, if D j , t D 1; : : : ; n, remains unchanged, ?-property holds. Finally, set stat`i i D C i jS jyjk 0 jk 1 .
Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 /. Upon this, if .i; y; k 0 ; k 1 / 2 Q, then (regardless of the concrete value for i ), the oracle will take .k 0 ; k 1 / from it and finish the remaining simulation in this query normally and keep all ¹D t º unchanged. If .i; y; k 0 ; k 1 / 6 2 Q, oracle will use Â and i to verify 0 , and (if valid) announce the success of A, which has two cases.
(1) 0 is valid and T . i ; y/ 2 L. This case occurs only for at most one i (denoted by i .y/) by regularity property R-2 of .T; T /.
(2) 0 is valid and T . i ; y/ 6 2 L. This is a Bad event in 2 (negligible, ignored, see Lemma 11) .
Hence, case (1) occurs (hence i D i .y/) with probability Ä 1=jD i j by induction (since, given view t 1 .A/, ¹ j º j is uniform in Q j D j and especially i is uniform in D i ); when case (1) does not occur (i.e., 0 invalid), then the adversary view in this query is identical (i.e., reject) for any password setup: take Reveal; Test; Send.2; : : :/; Send.3; : : :/. They are processed only with a session state from Send.0; / or Send.1; /, which is well-defined as above. Thus the simulation is perfect.
Corrupt.i /. In this case, i is revealed and hence D i is updated to ¹ i º. Notice that ¹stat`i i º`i are consistent with all ¹ j º j 2 Q j D j by induction. Thus, if we keep D j unchanged for j ¤ i , then ?-property still holds. Now we consider Non-Auth i event. It occurs at either some …`i i or …`S S with pid`S S D C i . By Lemma 12, it is impossible to the former. For the latter, by Lemma 13, it must hold that .i; y; ; / 6 2 Q in Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 / query and hence case (1) (i.e., i D i .y/) must occur (since case (2) is negligible and ignored). It remains to calculate the probability i D i .y/ throughout the game. As analyzed above, it has a probability 1=jD i j, conditional on that previous queries with msg 1 D C i j do not have such an event. Hence, as a summery, i D i .y/ occurs in the`th such a Send.1; S; ; C i j j / query with probability We claim that there are at most Q i Send.1; S; ; C i jyj / queries for fixed C i such that .i; y; ; / 6 2 Q with Client.…`S S / D C i . Indeed, although we decomposed Execute at the beginning of the theorem proof into four Send.d; / queries, this treatment does not invalidate the above statement: in the special Send.1; S;`S ; C i jyj 0 / query (decomposed from query Execute.i;`i ; S;`S /), .i; y; ; / 2 Q was recorded by …`i i in Send.0; i;`i ; null/ (decomposed from the same Execute query). So Non-Auth i does not occur to such a special Send query. Thus, 
